Real-time systems must meet strict timeliness requirements. These systems also often need to protect their critical program information (CPI) from adversarial interference and intellectual property theft. Trusted execution environments (TEE) execute CPI tasks on a special-purpose processor, thus providing hardware protection. However, adapting a system written to execute in environments without TEE requires partitioning the code into untrusted and trusted parts. This process involves complex manual program transformations that are not only laborious and intellectually tiresome, but also hard to validate and verify adherence to real-time constraints. To address these problems, this paper presents novel program analyses and transformation techniques, accessible to the developer via a declarative meta-programming model. The developer declaratively specifies the CPI portion of the system. A custom static analysis checks CPI specifications for validity, while probe-based profiling helps identify whether the transformed system would continue to meet the original real-time constraints, with a feedback loop suggesting how to modify the code, so its CPI can be isolated. Finally, an automated refactoring isolates the CPI portion for TEE-based execution, communicated with through generated calls to the TEE API. The reference implementation of our approach profiles and transforms realtime systems to isolate their CPI functions to execute on two different TEE platforms: OP-TEE and SGX. Although these platforms substantially differ in terms of their respective APIs and performance characteristics, our refactoring completely hides these differences from the developer by automatically synthesizing the correct CPI functionality required for these dissimilar TEE implementations. We have evaluated our approach by successfully enabling the trusted execution of the CPI portions of several microbenchmarks and a drone autopilot. Our approach shows the promise of declarative meta-programming in reducing the programmer effort required to adapt systems for trusted execution under real-time constraints.
Introduction
The execution of mission-critical real-time systems must comply with realtime constraints. Many such systems also contain vulnerable critical program information (CPI) (i.e., sensitive algorithms and data) that must be protected.
Failing to satisfy either of these requirements can lead to catastrophic conse- 5 quences. Consider using an autonomous delivery drone to transport packages, containing food, water, medicine, or vaccines, to remote and hard-to-reach locations. Emergency personnel and professional nature explorers often depend on drone delivery when dealing with various crises. The drone's navigation component has real-time constraints; if it fails to compute the instructions for the 10 autopilot to adjust the flight's directions or airspeed in a timely fashion, the drone may become unable to adjust its trajectory properly and deviate from the programmed delivery route. Since the cargo often must be delivered under strict time requirements, deviating from the shortest route can cause the entire delivery mission to fail. In addition, the software controlling module (e.g., 15 navigation) constitutes critical program information (CPI). If an ill-intentioned entity takes control over the module's execution, the entire drone can be misrouted, causing the delivery to fail. Irrespective of the causes, the consequences of a failed delivery can be potentially life-threatening.
The vulnerabilities above can be mitigated by isolating CPI functions in a 20 secure execution environment that would also control their interactions with the outside world. As a way to realize this idea, hardware manufacturers have started providing trusted execution environments (TEEs), special-purpose processors that can be used to execute CPI-dependent functionality. TEE can reliably isolate trusted code (i.e., in the secure world) from regular code (i.e., in 25 the normal world); the secure world comes with its own trusted hardware, storage, and operating system. A special communication API is the only avenue for interacting with TEE-based code. With the TEEs being hard to compromise, isolating CPI in the secure world effectively counteracts adversarial attacks and prevents intellectual property theft. However, to benefit from trusted execution, 30 systems must be designed and implemented to use different implementations of the TEE (e.g., OP-TEE [1], SGX [2] ). Adapting existing real-time systems to use the TEE requires non-trivial, error-prone program transformations, while the transformed system's execution must continue to adhere to the original realtime constraints. 35 In particular, a developer transforming a system to take advantage of the newly introduced TEE module requires undertaking the following tasks: 1) isolate CPI-dependent code; 2) redirect invocations of CPI functions to TEE communication API calls; 3) verify that the transformed system continues to meet the original real-time constraints. Notice that all of these tasks are hard 40 to perform correctly by hand.
To complete task 1), a developer not only needs to correctly extract the CPIdependent code from the system, but also correctly identify all the dependencies; due to the potential complexity of these dependencies, some CPI-dependent code cannot be isolated in TEEs. Most importantly, different TEEs (e.g., OP-TEE 45 and SGX) expose dissimilar APIs and conventions for isolating CPI functions.
A CPI-dependent function can be isolated in both TEE implementations, only one of them, or neither of them. To determine how a CPI function can be isolated, developers must be intimately familiar with both the original source code and the requirements of each TEE implementation. As is often the case, developers performing adaptive maintenance are often not the ones who wrote the original system. To facilitate this difficult and error-prone process, prior work has proposed automatic program partitioning, even in the presence of pointer-based function parameters [3] . However, this prior work leaves out the issues of verifying whether a given partitioning strategy is valid or whether the 55 partitioned system would comply with the real-time constraints.
To complete task 2), the developer must write by hand the communication logic required for the normal and secure worlds to talk to each other, correctly applying suitable TEE APIs that establish customized communication channels.
However, to accomplish this task correctly, developers must invest a great deal of 60 time and effort to learn and master both the OP-TEE or SGX implementations: the OP-TEE provides more than 130 APIs and about 40 data types [4, 5, 6] , while SGX provides an Enclave Definition Language (EDL) with more than ten syntactic categories [7] .
To complete task 3), the developer must be willing to develop additional 65 test cases that can verify whether the transformed system satisfies the original real-time constraints. Existing approaches take advantage of profiling tools, including Pin tool [8] and gperftools [9] , which require that profiling probes be added by hand.
To facilitate the process of adapting real-time systems to protect their CPI-70 dependent code using a TEE, this article presents RT-Trust, a program analysis and transformation toolset that supports developers in partitioning Clanguage systems in the presence of real-time constraints. The developer can either specify the TEE implementation (i.e., OP-TEE or SGX) as a compiler option, or rely on RT-Trust to automatically determine the available imple-75 mentation by inspecting the system. Through a meta-programming model, the developer annotates individual C functions to be isolated into the secure world.
Based on the annotations, the RT-Trust static and dynamic analyses determine whether the suggested partitioning strategy is feasible, and whether the partitioned system would comply with the original real-time constraints for both 80 the OP-TEE or SGX. A continuous feedback loop guides the developer in restructuring the system, so it can be successfully partitioned. Finally, RT-Trust transforms the system into the regular and trusted parts, with custom generated TEE-specific communication channel between them. If the transformed code fails to meet real-time constraints, it raises custom-handled exceptions. 85 RT-Trust reduces the programmer effort required to partition real-time systems to take advantage of the emerging TEEs.
The contribution of this paper is four-fold: 1. A Fully Declarative Meta-Programming Model for partitioning real-time systems written in C to take advantage of the TEEs; the model 90 is realized as domain-specific annotations that capture the requirements of different partitioning scenarios.
Static and Dynamic Checking
Mechanisms that identify whether a system can be partitioned as specified for a given TEE implementation, and how likely the partitioned version is to meet the original real-time 95 constraints. The analyses integrate a feedback mechanism that informs developers how they can restructure their systems, so they can be successfully partitioned.
3. RT-Trust Refactoring, a compiler-based program transformation for C programs that operates at the IR level, while also generating customized 100 communication channels and real-time deadline violation handling.
A Platform-Independent Metric for assessing by how much a CPI
function is expected to degrade its performance once moved to the TEE, and comparing such degradations between different TEEs; we evaluate the applicability of this metric on five classic security algorithms and two 105 critical functions in a popular drone controller system.
To concretely realize our approach, we have created RT-Trust as custom LLVM passes and runtime support. Our evaluation shows that RT-Trust saves considerable programmer effort by providing accurate program analyses and automated refactoring. RT-Trust's profiling facilities also accurately predict 110 whether refactored subjects would continue meeting real-time constraints.
This article extends our earlier paper, presented at the 17 th International Conference on Generative Programming: Concepts Experience (GPCE 2018) [10] . In comparison to that prior publication, this article reports on the additional research we have performed to enable RT-Trust to support SGX, in 115 addition to the original version that was limited only to the OP-TEE. Our experiences of designing, engineering, and evaluating our approach to support both of these popular TEE implementations should be of value and relevance to the audience of this journal.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the 120 technical background for this research. Section 3 gives an overview of the RT-Trust toolchain. Section 4 details the RT-Trust meta-programming model. Section 5 and Section 6 further describe the RT-Trust mechanisms for profiling and code refactoring, respectively. Section 7 describes our platform-independent metric. Section 8 describes our evaluation. Section9 discusses the limitations 125 of TEE implementations and RT-Trust. Section 10 discusses related work. Section 11 presents conclusions and future work directions.
Background
In this section, we introduce the technical background required to understand our contributions. We briefly discuss CPI, TEE, and real-time constraints.
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Afterward, we discuss known security risks that motivate this work.
Critical Program Information (CPI)
Although the concept of critical program information was originally introduced by the US DoD as representing parts of a system that can raise the technological superiority for war-fighters [11] , the term has been embraced by 135 all security-sensitive domains. The CPI can include algorithms, data, and hardware of a security-sensitive system. In our design, we designate C functions as constituting CPI, if they happen to contain critical algorithms and manipulate sensitive data. Hence, RT-Trust operates at the function level, including static analysis, profiling, and code transformation. Our declarative program-140 ming model provides special-purpose annotations for developers to mark the CPI functions (we detail our programming model in Section 4).
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
TEE [12] offers a standardized hardware solution that protects CPI from being compromised. First, TEE isolates a secure area of the CPU (i.e., the 145 secure world for trusted applications) from the normal area (i.e., the normal world for common applications) 2 .
That is, the secure world possesses a separate computing unit and an independent OS that prevents unauthorized external peripherals from directly executing the trusted tasks. In addition, TEE provides trusted storage that 150 can only be accessed via the provided API to securely persist data. Finally, TEE offers an API to the secure communication channel, as the only avenue for external entities to communicate with the secure world.
OP-TEE.
[1] Following the Global Platform Specifications of TEE, OP-TEE provides a hardware isolation mechanism that primarily relies on the ARM 155 TrustZone, with three essential features: 1) it isolates the Trusted OS from the Rich OS (e.g., Linux) to protect the executions of Trusted Applications (TAs) via underlying hardware support; 2) it requires reasonable space to reside in the on-chip memory; 3) it can be easily pluggable to various architectures and hardware.
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SGX. [2] Another implementation of TEE is Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX). It protects computation integrity and confidentiality by extending the Intel architecture. In the same way as OP-TEE, SGX requires that developers divide the original code into two parts: regular and trusted. The former runs 2 The normal and secure world are the terms commonly used in the TEE realm. That is, if the code runs in the secure world, it is considered "trusted" (i.e., under protection); if it runs in the normal world, then it is considered "untrusted" (i.e., without protection and may be compromised).
inside of the enclave, a protected area that isolates the execution resources from the outside environment (kernel, hypervisor, etc.), in which the latter runs.
Furthermore, the regular components can only access the enclave via special CPU instructions. Hence, if run or loaded inside the enclave, the application's CPI becomes invulnerable to attacks perpetrated from compromised outside environments. 170 
Real-Time Constraints
In general, real-time constraints [13] are the restrictions on the timing of events that should be satisfied by a real-time system; these restrictions can be classified into time deadlines and periodicity limits [14] . The former restricts the deadline by which a particular task must complete its execution. The latter 175 restricts how often a given event should be triggered. For example, given the periodicity limit of 50ms and the time deadline of 20ms, a drone task must obtain its GPS location within 20ms for each 50ms period.
In our case, due to the memory limitation of the TEE, the event's memory consumption is another constraint. As we mentioned in Section 2.2, the TEE 180 should maintain a small footprint by occupying limited space in memory. Also, if the TEE solution applies eMMC RPMB [15] as trusted storage only, the memory consumption is limited by the size of the RPMB partition, due to the persistent objects being stored in the RPMB.
As determined by how strict the timeliness requirements are, real-time con-185 straints are categorized into hard and soft. The former constraints must be satisfied while the latter can be tolerated with associated ranges. For example, a drone's motor/flight surface control must respond on time (hard constraint), while its navigation according to waypoints is expected to be resilient to deviations caused by GPS signal being temporarily lost or even wind gusts (soft 190 constraint).
Security Risks
Attackers are known to go after compromising CPI. A large amount of known relevant security risks have been reported by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [16] . First, without a proper access control and authentication mechanism for critical functions, attackers can maliciously access and consume the significant amount of resources [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] . Secondly, the possibility of information leakage sharply rises by the vulnerable critical functions 
Solution Overview
In this section, we introduce the toolchain of our compiler-based analyzer and code refactoring tool, and then we describe the input and output of RT-Trust. For our meta-programming model, we design and implement a set of domainspecific annotations that describe the real-time constraints, code transformation and generation strategies required to automatically transform a real-time system, so its subset can be partitioned to TEE for trusted execution. We call our 275 domain-specific annotations Real-Time Trust Annotations, or RTTA for short.
Code Transformation and Generation
We integrate RTTAs with the base Clang annotation system, so the compiler can analyze and transform real-time systems, as entirely based on the declarative annotations, thus reducing the development burden by enabling powerful compiler-based code analysis and transformation. In this section, we first de-280 scribe the general syntax of RTTAs. Then, we introduce each annotation and its dependencies in turn. Finally, we illustrate how to use these annotations through an example.
General Syntax
In the code snippet below, RTTA follows the GNU style [31], one of the gen- 
Code Partition Annotation
The code partition annotation informs RT-Trust to perform two tasks: 1) analyze the validity of partitioning for each annotated function, and 2) extract the annotated functions that can be partitioned from the source code. The 300 annotation partition can be applied to any declared function in the source code, and takes no arguments, as follows:
1 __attribute__((partition))
Code Generation Annotations
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Code generation annotations that appear in the code snippet below enable developers to customize 1) a specific communication mechanism (e.g., RPC)
for the normal and secure worlds to talk to each other, and 2) an exception handler for handling the cases of violating real-time constraints when executing a partitioned system. When annotating with rpc, the developer can specify 310 the shared_memory or socket options as the underlying RPC delivery mechanism.
The data transferred between the partitions can be specified to be encrypted or compressed by using the yes and no options. Note that the rpc annotation applies only to OP-TEE to specify how to generate RPC stubs. For SGX, 
RT-Trust
RTTA Dependencies
As compared to the annotations that can be specified independently (e.g., partition, rpc, and the profiling annotations), other annotations must be spec- In the rest of the manuscript, we discuss some of the details of the RT-Trust profiling, code transformation, and code generation infrastructure. 
Analyses for Real-Time Compliance
The automated refactoring described here has several applicability limitations. One set of limitations stems from the structure of the system and its subset that needs to be moved to the trusted partition. Another set of lim-itations are due to the increase in latency that results in placing a system's subset to the trusted execution zone and replacing direct function calls with RPC calls. The increase in latency can cause the system to miss its real-time deadlines, rendering the entire system unusable for its intended operation. To check if the structure of the system allows for the refactoring to be performed, 445 RT-Trust features a domain-specific static analysis. To estimate if the refactored system would still meet real-time requirements, RT-Trust offers several profiling mechanisms, which are enabled and configured by means of RTTAs.
Static Analysis
The is reasonable for the target domain of real-time systems written in C, in which functions are bound statically to ensure predictable system execution.
For SGX, the zigzag rule states that even though functions in T 2 can invoke functions in T 1 , such invocations must be restricted to some small number (i.e., threshold) due to the high communication latency between the normal and 475 secure worlds. That is, although SGX supports the zigzag calls, the program performance suffers from the high latency of such invocations [32] . One can tune the threshold to balance the trade-off between efficiency and utility. Once the threshold comes to "0", the zigzag rule regresses to the one used for OP-TEE.
Global Variable Rule. Since the partitioning is performed at the function level, 480 the distributed global state cannot be maintained. As a result, each global variable can be placed either in the normal or trusted partition and accessed locally by its co-located functions. Violations of this rule can be easily detected.
One exception to this rule is constant global variables, which due to being unmodifiable can be replicated across partitions. (Figure 3 (c) ), or make this global variable constant. Finally, RT-Trust constructs the PFG with all the necessary information for each function, as shown in Figure 3 (d) . 
Dynamic Analyses
Analyzing Time Constraints
As mentioned in Section 2, time constraints mainly include the time deadline and the periodicity limit. The former defines the upper boundary for a function to complete its execution, the latter restricts the time that can elapse between any pair of invocations.
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To analyze these constraints, RT-Trust first transforms the original LLVM IR program via two key steps: 1) find the correct call sites, and 2) insert the suitable function calls. In the transformation procedure below, given a function annotated with exetime, RT-Trust traverses its instructions to locate the first instruction in its entry basic-block 3 , inserting the profiling probes and then that 565 starts a profiling session. Likewise, RT-Trust locates each return instruction of the annotated function, inserting the probes that issue the end profiling session, which stops the profiling. All these measured results are first stored in a hash table, with the key corresponding to the annotated function's name and the value to its profiling record. Finally, the hash table is persisted into an external file for further exploration.
Memory Consumption Profiling
Memory consumption is an important issue for trusted execution. First,
TEEs are designed to occupy limited memory space (as discussed in Section 2). 
Exception Handling
Having annotated a function with real-time constraints, developers can also specify how to handle the violation of these constraints via the exhandler anno- (EDL) file that provides metadata for all the CPI functions. By passing the generated EDL file as input to the Edger8r tool [34] , developers then generate the required SGX communication logic for all interactions between the regular and trusted parts. For both OP-TEE and SGX, RT-Trust redirects the direct invocation of a CPI function to its RPC stub (for OP-TEE) or its proxy function 665 (for SGX).
Generating RPC stubs for OP-TEE
RT-Trust generates RPC stubs based on the developer's configuration in annotation rpc and paramlen. The argument <type> of rpc specifies which underlying delivery mechanism (i.e., shared memory or socket) to generate. This 670 delivery mechanism also depends on the actual TEE implementation in place.
To exchange data between the normal and secure worlds, OP-TEE provides 4
shared memory buffers, used as the delivery mechanism. However, RT-Trust must marshal/unmarshal function parameters to and from these buffers. This explicit parameter marshaling makes the generated code suitable for any com- developers can either directly use the generated code for the trusted execution or extend that code in order to meet some special requirements.
Generating proxy functions and EDL file for SGX
Based on the partitionable functions' information in the PFG, RT-Trust generates an EDL file, assembling the declarations of trusted functions into the 705 "trusted" block, and that of regular functions invoked from the trusted part in a zigzag pattern into the "untrusted" block. Most importantly, for each pointer parameter in both the trusted and untrusted function blocks, RT-Trust checks the paramlen annotation to generate the EDL attributes that determine the size of pointer-based parameters. For each function containing struct parameters,
Data Encoding Protocols
The normal and secure worlds are represented by distinct system components, running in separate address spaces. The inter-process communication facility, through which the worlds interact with each other, require that all the data passed between them be encoded as an array of bytes. RT-Trust has to be 745 able to encode the regular part's data structures into this array of bytes, while the corresponding trusted part has to read these data structures from the array once it is transferred to the secure world. This problem is not new, and multiple marshaling mechanisms [35] have been introduced, including major framework platforms, such as CORBA [36] and gRPC [37] . For SGX, the Edger8r Tool Given that TEE is frequently used as a secure data storage, this ability to encode data collection parameters space-efficiently increases the applicability of RT-Trust. Figure 5 shows how RT-Trust differently encodes parameters that are: 760 a) primitive types (e.g., int, char, double), and b) complex type (e.g., struct, union). The encoding represents all data as a byte array, and when storing both primitive and complex data, it starts with the same header that contains the total len (the total length of all the entries in this encoding), and num (the total number of items in the encoded collection) fields. These fields are 765 both stored into a 4 bytes integer. The following entries differ depending on the encoded type. For primitive types, RT-Trust then stores the size of the encoded data type, which is then followed by the actual data content. For complex types, RT-Trust first stores the type header: the total len (the total length of all the members in this type), and num (the total number of 770 members in this type) fields, followed by the size of each member and its actual content in turn. This scheme enables the receiving party to first extract the total length to be able to allocate the amount of memory required to contain the entire encoding. The transfer process needs to allocate memory twice: first in the shared memory, which serves as a delivery vehicle to the secure world, 775 and then in the trusted part to be able to store the transferred data.
Kernel Space
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Support for Partitioning Decision Making
As discussed in Finally, we calculate the maximum value of the normalized results to obtain FPI :
L exe = T af ter /T bef ore ; (T bef ore , T af ter are execution times) (1)
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L inv = I af ter /I bef ore ; (I bef ore , I af ter are invocation intervals) (2)
F P I = M ax(tanh(log(L exe )), tanh(log(L inv ))) (3)
FPI shows the expected performance degradation factor. Notice that FPI can take upon values that range between 0 and 1. We offer the following guidelines to developers, as based on the ranges of FPI values: between 0 and .25, 800 the expected degradation is minimal ; between .26 and .75, the degradation is medium; and between .76 and 1, the degradation is high. Which level of performance degradation is acceptable for a given application scenario is up to the developer to determine.
For example, a CPI function f is annotated to be moved to TEE. Before 805 moving f, its execution time and invocation interval are 1 and 5 seconds, respectively. After moving f to TEE, its time and interval become 10 and 20 seconds, respectively. Hence, f's L exe is 10/1 = 10, L inv is 20/5 = 4, resulting in FPI of M ax(tanh(log10), tanh(log4)) = 0.76. In other words, moving f to TEE would increase its execution costs by a factor of 0.76. This performance 810 degradation level is in the low range of high.
As a simple but intuitive metric, FPI provides a convenient heuristic that can help developers determine whether moving a CPI function to the TEE would continue satisfying the timeliness requirements. Under SGX and OP-TEE, FPI can differ for the same CPI functions. So this metric can also help developers 815 select the most appropriate TEE implementation for a given real-time system.
Evaluation
We answer the following research questions in our evaluation:
• Effort: How much programmer effort is saved by applying RT-Trust?
• Performance: What is the added performance overhead imposed by per-820 forming a RT-Trust profiling on a representative real-time system?
• Value: How effectively can RT-Trust determine whether a planned refactoring would preserve the original real-time constraints?
• Accuracy: How accurately can our profiling infrastructure predict the expected performance deterioration caused by a RT-Trust refactoring?
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• Limitations: What are some limitations of RT-Trust's applicability?
Experimental Setup
To answer the evaluation questions above, we have concretely implemented RT-Trust and assessed its various characteristics in a realistic deployment scenario, whose experimental setup is as follows. Evaluation Design. As described in Section 5 and 6, developers can customize 860 the implementations of profiling, EDL file and RPC stubs. However, we evaluate only the default options of using RT-Trust to establish its baseline performance, thus not unfairly benefiting our implementation.
We evaluate programmer effort as the uncommented lines of code (ULOC):
1) those required to write RTTAs, 2) those automatically generated by RT-
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Trust, and 3) those that the developer is expected to fine-tune by hand (e.g., some source code may need to be modified to fix the violations of our partitioning rules, or the parameter's length in an RPC stub / EDL file may need to be manually adjusted To evaluate value and accuracy, we first apply RT-Trust to profile the specified CPI functions before and after moving them to the secure world. Then, we compare the results reported by the profiling of the original unpartitioned system with respect to meeting the real-time constraints with that of its partitioned version. Further, by analyzing the performance results, we discuss 1) which procedure causes the performance deterioration after moving the CPI function to the secure world, 2) whether we can accurately predict the specified function's performance in the secure world by analyzing its performance in the normal world, and 3) 900 which TEE implementation can better preserve the timeliness requirements of our evaluation cases. To explain RT-Trust's limitations by describing several program cases that require a prohibitively high programmer effort to adjust the generated RPC stubs.
Results
905
We verify the correctness of RT-Trust by applying all its LLVM passes (i.e., code analysis, transformation, and generation) to microbenchmarks. We evaluate RT-Trust as follows. This drastic performance difference is mainly due to the differences between the efficiency of standard Linux system calls and their TEE counterparts. For example, the standard gettimeofday is more efficient than either TEE_GetREETime in the OP-TEE or sgx_get_trusted_time in the SGX.
The heavy performance overhead of trusted execution prevents the profiling 950 of real trusted system operation. When estimating memory consumption, the overhead of capturing the memory allocated for local variables and the pointer parameters never exceeds 0.06ms. However, the overall overhead depends on the total number of local variables and pointer parameters. For example, if a function allocates memory for n variables, the total overhead would be ≈ 955 0.053 * n (ms). Thus, to prevent the profiling overheads from affecting the realtime constraints, the RT-Trust profiling is best combined with the system's testing phase. Value and Accuracy. Table 3 shows the results of profiling the CPI functions, with the profiling overhead subtracted. The value before " " is the results for the 960 OP-TEE, and after " " is that for the SGX. For the execution time, generally, the time consumed by our micro-benchmarks and the CPI PX4 functions in the secure world ("After" column) is similar to that in the normal world ("Before" column 
Discussion
In this section, we first discuss the limitations of TEE implementations and RT-Trust. Then after comparing the OP-TEE with the SGX, we discuss their most suitable usage scenarios. is, one cannot spawn a thread (e.g., by using pthreads) inside the secure world.
Furthermore, both TEEs re-implement their special versions of the standard system and C/C++ libraries. For example, the printf implementation of the OP-TEE cannot print float or double values. Similarly, the SGX provides neither strcpy nor strcat, instead requiring that developers use the provided strncpy and 1020 strncat instead [41] .
RT-Trust Limitations. For OP-TEE, consider the scenario of passing a struct pointer to the specified function. The struct pointer is a linked list that has 100 elements. Each element has a char pointer as the data field. In that case, developers need to modify more than 100 ULOC in the generated RPC TEEs in all benchmarks. The faster the execution before moving to the TEE, the larger the FPI value (i.e., more performance degradation). The reason is 1050 that if a function runs fast (e.g., 1.15 ms for CRC32), the additional costs of the communication channel (i.e., 253.17 ms for CRC 32) dominate the total execution time. Another concern is the execution latencies in the secure world. In the case of RC4, moving the CPI functions to the SGX doubles their execution time. However, after moving the same functions to the OP-TEE, the execution 1055 time stays similar (as shown in Table 3 ). Hence, RC4's FPI for the SGX (i.e., 0.435) is larger than that for the OP-TEE (i.e., 0.142). To sum up, developers should always use the TEE with the smallest FPI value. However, if a CPI function's execution time is much smaller than the time taken by the communication channel, then both the OP-TEE and the SGX impose a comparable 1060 high-performance degradation.
Related Work
RT-Trust is related to DSLs for real-time systems, execution profiling, application partitioning, and code refactoring for trusted execution.
DSLs for real-time systems: Real Time Logic (RTL) formalizes real-time execution properties [42] . Subsequent DSLs for real-time systems include Hume that helps ensure that resource-limited, real-time systems meet execution constraints [43] . Flake et al.
[44] add real-time constraints to the Object Constraint Language (OCL). Several efforts extend high-level programming languages to meet real-time execution requirements [45, 46, 47] . RT-Trust's RTTAs can also 1070 be seen as a declarative DSL for real-time constraints, albeit to be maintained when the original real-time system is refactored to protect its CPI functionality.
Execution Profiling: Several existing dynamic profiling tools, such as Pin tool [8] , gperftools [9] , and Gprof [48] , ascertain program performance behavior. However, Pin and gperftools require that developers manually add profiling 1075 probes. Further, to profile program in TEE, one would have to pre-deploy their dependent libraries, which may be incompatible with particular TEE implementations. RT-Trust differs by automatically inserting profiling probes into the specified functions. Further, it estimates TEE-based execution characteristics without any pre-deployment.
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Application Partitioning: J-Orchestra partitions the Java bytecode of a centralized application into a distributed application [49] . Given programmer annotations, Swift transforms a web application into a secure web application, in which the server-side Java part and the client-side JavaScript part interact with each other via HTTP [50] . ZØ compiles annotated C# code of a centralized application into a distributed multi-tier version to improve confidentiality and integrity, as directed by an automatically produced zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [51] . By enforcing a dynamic information flow control mechanism, Fission automatically and securely splits a JavaScript program into the client and server parts [52] . Pyxis automatically partitions database-backed applica- extracts subsets of C programs to take advantage of Intel SGX enclaves [58] .
As compared with these works, RT-Trust not only supports the correct and automatic partitioning of legacy C code, but it also takes the real-time performance implications of the partitioning into account. By means of its profiling infrastructure and the FPI metric, RT-Trust predicts the degree to which a 1105 requested partitioning would decrease the system's real-time performance and also informs developers how to select between TEE implementations.
Future Work and Conclusion
One future work direction is to reduce the programmer effort required to provide the code for marshaling and unmarshaling complicated struct pointers 1110 with unknown bounds information. Another direction in this area is to automatically detect which functions are CPI-dependent and need to be protected in the secure world. Finally, we plan to experiment with symbolic analysis as another way of estimating the performance of refactored systems.
We have presented RT-Trust that provides a fully declarative meta-program- 
